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We consider an economy with a tax on all labor earnings. We discover that a slightly-
binding minimum wage on one sector can enhance efficiency. The minimum wage 
attracts high-reservation wage workers into the minimum-wage sector. If the labor 
demand curve in the free sector is quite flat, the vast majority of workers displaced by the 
minimum wage find employment in the free sector, raising aggregate employment. This 
displacement of workers by the only slightly-binding minimum wage has negligible 
effects on efficiency. So efficiency and tax revenue rise as the minimum wage pulls labor 
out of untaxed leisure, where too much of the labor force is lurking, into taxed work. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Milton Friedman (1976, pp. 189-193) and many others have noted that a minimum wage 
may increase employment and efficiency when all labor is hired by a monopsony. Thus, 
it is well known that a minimum wage in the presence of one type of market distortion 
can be efficiency enhancing. In this paper, we present another example.  Drawing on 
Chilean institutions, we argue that when wages are taxed, a slightly binding minimum 
wage covering only part of the labor market will draw new workers into the labor market, 
attracted by the higher wage. The initially-employed workers displaced by the minimum 
wage drive down the wage in the uncovered sector. If the labor demand elasticity is 
higher there, than in the minimum-wage sector, many will find employment there, and 
the minimum wage will raise total employment. If labor services are taxed and leisure is 
not, this will enhance efficiency. Just as in the monopsony case, an initial distortion 
means we have too little employment to begin with, and the minimum wage may mitigate 
the effect of that distortion. Both of these mechanisms are examples of the general theory 
of the second best. 
In this paper we model the interaction between minimum wages and taxes to find 
the precise conditions for a slightly binding minimum wage to be efficiency enhancing 
and to measure the efficiency gain.  This leads us to a discussion of how a policy maker 
may wish to use a minimum wage along with taxes on labor services to achieve the best 
possible mix of employment, economic efficiency and tax revenue. A succinct summary 
of the paper is provided by the six propositions scattered through it and the two closing 
sections. 
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2. THE CHILEAN LABOR MARKET 
Edwards and Edwards (1991, 153) describe the Chilean labor market during the period 
1973-1983. 
One segment, which we have called “protected,” comprises all workers in those sectors 
where wages have been protected from changing market conditions by virtue of the 
indexation mechanism [an inflexible downward real wage] and the minimum wage laws. 
These include mining, manufacturing, construction, utilities, commerce, transportation and 
communications, financial services, and government.  The “free” segment on the other 
hand, comprises employment in those sectors where wages are set freely, either because 
they are not covered by the minimum wage or indexation legislation or because 
employment is of temporary nature.  We have included here agriculture, fishing, social, 
personal, and domestic services. 
 
Workers prefer jobs in the “protected” sector but accept jobs in the “free” sector so 
long as the free sector wage exceeds their reservation price.  As the Edwards' model the 
labor market, all workers with reservation wages below the “protected” wage, including 
those employed in the free sector, search for employment in the protected sector. A 
worker does not have to be unemployed to search for a better job, so the minimum wage 
does not contribute directly to unemployment. 
The Edwards also note (p.151): 
Traditionally social security taxes had been very high, introducing important distortions in 
the labor market. In 1974, for example, total taxes on blue-collar workers, as a proportion 
of net wages, amounted to 56.9 percent. 
 
The Edwards' characterization of the Chilean labor market is what Gang and Tower 
(1990), GT, refer to as an employment lottery (the on-the-job-search or Welch, 1974, 
case).
1  GT is a version of the paper without the taxation of labor earnings.  It finds that 
with the lottery, imposition of a minimum wage in one sector may raise aggregate 
employment.  Like the Edwards, GT characterize those with a reservation wage between   4 
 
the protected wage and the free wage who are not employed in the protected sector as 
unemployed.  GT also find that in spite of the possibility that the minimum wage will 
raise employment, it will always reduce economic welfare once the value of leisure is 
accounted for. 
Next we ask in the context of the Edwards' model:  What is the condition for an 
increase in the minimum wage, starting from the free level to raise employment?  Then 
we ask: If labor services are taxed, what is the condition for an increase in the minimum 
wage to raise economic efficiency? 
 
3. HOW THE MINIMUM WAGE AFFECTS EMPLOYMENT 
Our economy is a small open one, which consists of two sectors, manufacturing and 
agriculture.  Labor and a fixed stock of capital produce manufactures.  Labor and a fixed 
stock of land produce agriculture.  Both goods are traded freely at fixed world prices, and 
the exchange rate is fixed.  This fixes prices to consumers so real and nominal wages are 
identical.  Labor is perfectly mobile between the two sectors.  Manufacturing is covered 
by a minimum wage, which is non-binding initially.  The wage in agriculture is free.  The 
supply of labor is upward sloping, with workers preferring employment in the high wage 
sector. “0” superscripts denote initial values.  Initially the disposable (after-tax) wage in 
the covered sector equals the disposable wage in the uncovered sector:  
0 0 u c = .           ( 1 )  
                                                                                                                                                 
1 Modern Turkey has similar labor market conditions: See Senses (1996) for details.  Also see Basch and 
Parades-Molina (1996, p.310) who conclude “in this paper we have presented strong evidence showing that 
the labor market in Chile can be characterized by two labor markets instead of one.”   5 
 
All employment contracts are for the same number of hours.  However, workers have 
different reservation wages.  Employment consists of labor employed in manufacturing 
and agriculture (the covered and uncovered sectors respectively): 
U C E + = .            ( 2 )  
Using a “hat” to denote a proportional change, differentiating (2)  
^ ^ ^
U U C C E E + = .            ( 3 )  
Denoting the elasticities of demand for labor in the two sectors as  , 0 s ' > η  
^ ^
, u U u η − =          ( 4 )  
and 
^ ^
. c C c η − =            ( 5 )  
Ac is the number of workers who apply for jobs when all sectors pay the covered wage, 




. c Ac ε =            ( 6 )  
Au is the number of workers who apply for jobs when all sectors pay the uncovered wage.  
Thus, 
^ ^
. u Au ε =            ( 7 )  
                                                 
2 Barro (1996) quotes the results from a paper by David Neumark and William Wascher: "Apparently, 
many teenagers who previously classified school as their major activity are induced by the higher minimum 
wage to leave school for full time work."   6 
 
  Manufacturing jobs are allocated by lottery, and a fraction π of all jobs seekers 
achieve their preferred employment (in manufacturing).  Thus, the residual supply of 
labor to agriculture is 
[] π − = 1 A S u u .            ( 8 )  




= π .             ( 9 )  
In agriculture the labor market clears, so 
^ ^
u S U = .           ( 1 0 )  
We assume that our economy starts with the minimum wage equal to the covered 
wage, so the labor market clears: 
0 0 0
c U C A + = .            ( 1 1 )  
Logarithmically differentiate (8).  Substitute (7), (10), and the logarithmic differential of 
(9) into the result to eliminate  u u S , A  and 
^











^ ^ ^ ^
c A C
1
u U .           ( 1 2 )  
Substitute (4), (5) and (6) into (12) and then (9) and (11) into the result to eliminate π: 
[]










.            ( 1 3 )  
                                                 
3 In the limit as the minimum manufacturing wage approaches the agricultural wage from above Ac 
approaches Au, but as the manufacturing wage rises further, depressing the agricultural wage, Ac rises while 
Au falls. We use (9) in its differential form, necessitating placing Ac rather than Au in the denominator.  
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The intuition behind (13) is that a slightly binding or “small” minimum wage reduces 
employment in the covered sector.  It also draws new workers into the labor market, 
attracted by the higher wage.  Thus it shifts employment in the covered sector from low 
reservation-wage workers to high reservation-wage workers.  This shifts the supply of 
workers to the uncovered sector to the right and thereby depresses the uncovered wage. 
Combining (3), (4), (5) and (13) yields 
[]
[] ε + η









.            ( 1 4 )  
Equation (14) gives us: 
Proposition 1:  A slightly binding minimum wage raises aggregate employment if and 
only if the elasticity of demand for labor in the uncovered sector exceeds that in the 
covered sector. 
Only in that circumstance will the new jobs created by a lower wage in the uncovered 
sector exceed those lost by the higher wage in the covered sector.  Equation (14) is 
elegantly simple and we believe it has not previously appeared in the literature.
4 
 
                                                 
4 Brown, Gilroy and Kohen [1982, p.491, left column] build a model using the same mechanism we use.  
They derive a formula for the elasticity of employment with respect to the minimum wage, assuming the 
elasticity of demand for labor is the same in both sectors.  For a slightly binding minimum wage (in their 
notation, Wm is close to Wu), they find the elasticity is zero as we do.  For a finite increase in the minimum 
wage, however, they find employment falls.  But their equations are valid only for a slightly binding 
minimum wage, i.e., they are first order approximations.  To make them (and the analyses of Welch 1974 
and 1976) precise, one must assume that their demand and supply curves of labor are straight lines, with the 
indicated elasticities applying at the initial undistorted equilibrium.  One must also replace their lnWi with 








i W , is the initial wage and  i W ∆ is its change.   8 
 
4. HOW THE MINIMUM WAGE AFFECTS EFFICIENCY 
We define the change in aggregate utility, dW, as the equivalent variation in income, and 
we remember that the initial wages in the two sectors are equal.  Tax revenue is 
redistributed to the population as a lump-sum subsidy.  Consequently, the change in the 
aggregate welfare is the sum of the change in the outputs weighted by consumer prices, 
pdX, minus the loss in leisure multiplied by the valuation of a unit of leisure, cdE: 
cdE pdX dW − = ,            ( 1 5 )  
where X and p are the vectors of outputs and consumer prices. 
A tax is levied as a proportion, t, of disposable labor income.  Since labor is paid its 
marginal product: 
cdE t 1 pdX ) ( + = .            ( 1 6 )  
Combining (15) and (16) yields 
tcdE dW = .             ( 1 7 )  
Equation (17) gives us: 
Proposition 2: If wages are taxed at a uniform ad valorem rate, imposition of a slightly 
binding minimum wage raises economic efficiency if and only if it raises employment. 
The rationale is that such a minimum wage hike draws labor into work, where it is 
taxed, away from untaxed leisure.  Equation (17) is quite simple.  Part of the simplicity 
arises from the fact that the costs generally associated with the minimum wage are 
triangles.  These are second order effects that can be disregarded when the minimum 
wage is barely binding.  When the minimum wage is barely binding and there is no tax, 
the values of the marginal products of labor, VMPLs, in the two sectors are the same and 
the reservation wage of all those who move between leisure and work is the same as the   9 
 
common VMPL. This results in a zero marginal efficiency cost of raising the minimum 
wage.  As the minimum wage rises, increasingly high-reservation-wage labor is enticed 
into the labor market, replacing low-reservation-wage labor, and labor is increasingly 
thrown from the high VMPL covered sector into the low VMPL uncovered sector.  These 
effects constitute GT’s efficiency cost of the minimum wage. 
So far we have been concerned only with barely binding minimum wages, which 
permits us to conclude that efficiency moves in the same direction as employment.  When 
the wage differential is finite, increasing employment becomes a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for a minimum-wage hike to increase efficiency. 
Combining (14) and (17) yields 
[]
ε + η
η − η ε
=
u
c u c cC t
dW
^
.           ( 1 8 )  
, , , , , i i i i i r w L K σ  and  Ki θ are respectively sector i’s stock of the fixed factor, labor 
employed, wage rate, rental rate, elasticity of substitution in production and the share 
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u c cC t
dW           ( 2 0 )    10 
 
Equation 20 gives: 
Proposition 3: Imposition of a slightly binding minimum wage raises efficiency if and 
only if the ratio of the elasticity of substitution to the fixed factor’s share of output in the 
uncovered sector exceeds that in the covered sector. 
  It is tempting to try to go further and calculate the optimum minimum wage.  The 
difficulty is that our problem is to find a second best optimum, and only first best optima 
have neat analytical solutions.  For a second best optimum one needs to resort to a 
simulation model like that of Grimes and Tower (1998). 
 
5. HOW THE MINIMUM WAGE AFFECTS TAX REVENUE 
 
Adopting a slightly binding minimum wage, raises the wage in the minimum wage sector 
but drops it in the free sector, so we expected its effect on total labor earnings and tax 
revenue in the presence of a constant ad valorem tax on labor earnings to be a complex 
expression. Now we derive it.  We define R as tax revenue, which is 
]. [ uU cC t R + =            ( 2 1 )  
Differentiating (21), while holding the tax rate constant, then substituting from (4), (5), 
(13) and (2) into the result, while remembering that initially c and u are equal yields 














= .           ( 2 2 )  
Comparing (22) with (14) and (18) shows that the proportional change in tax revenue 
(which equals that for the aggregate wage bill) has the same sign as the change in 
employment (and efficiency). Intuitively it makes sense that tax revenue rises by more,   11 
 
the more elastic the supply of labor, the less elastic the demand for labor in the covered 
sector, and the more elastic the demand for labor in the free sector. Hence: 
 
Proposition 4: If wages are taxed at a uniform ad valorem rate, imposition of a slightly 
binding minimum wage raises revenue and the wage bill if and only if it raises 
employment.  
 
6. DO OUR EQUATIONS MAKE SENSE? 
 
  Intuitively, it is obvious that the gain in employment, efficiency, the wage bill and 
tax revenue is larger, the lower the labor demand elasticity is in the covered sector (for 
fewer workers are displaced) and the higher the labor demand elasticity in the free sector 
(because the less the free wage has to decline in order to absorb the displaced workers). 
Employment and efficiency also rise by more the higher the labor supply elasticity is 
(because more workers are attracted into work by the minimum wage). But why is it that 
employment, efficiency and the wage bill are all unchanged when the two labor demand 
elasticities are identical? 
  To see this intuitively, let’s make our mental gymnastics more graceful by 
assuming equal initial employment in the two sectors. Establishing the slightly-binding 
minimum wage means that half of applicants for the preferred jobs will be successful. 
Therefore, at the initial free wage the number of workers that are newly attracted into the 
labor force is ĉεE/2 = ĉεU. They will take jobs from the previously employed. The 
number of  jobs in the covered sector are killed by the minimum wage is ĉηcC = ĉηcU .  
This means that at the initial free wage, there is now an excess supply of workers who   12 
 
have not found covered sector jobs of  ĉ[ηc+ ε]U.  The number of workers who find jobs 
in the free sector or pull out of the labor force as the free wage falls is -û[ηu+ε]U.  
  Labor market equilibrium in the uncovered sector dictates that the two 
expressions be equal.  Thus, when ηc = ηu,  û = -ĉ, i.e. the free wage falls by just as much 
as the covered wage rose.  Since the labor demand elasticities are the same, the number of 
jobs destroyed in the covered sector equals the number of jobs created in the free sector, 
with no change in employment or efficiency. Since the average wage hasn’t changed, the 
wage bill is unchanged and so is tax revenue.  
 
7. THE WELFARE-REVENUE TRADEOFF WHEN LABOR IS UNIFORMLY 
TAXED 
Now that we have learned how a slightly binding minimum wage affects efficiency in the 
presence of a tax, let’s see what we can say about the optimum mix of the tax and the 
minimum wage.  In the next two sections, we assume that tax revenue is distributed to a 
select group of the population, which is particularly worthy or has powerful political 
clout, so the policy maker cares about total tax revenue.  We also assume that opposition 
political parties harp on low employment levels and a low standard of living.  
Consequently, our policy maker seeks three objectives: employment, efficiency and tax 
revenue.   
Figure 1 goes about here. 
Figure 1 illustrates two frontiers showing the maximum levels of tax revenue for each 
level of welfare. Free Market Frontier, FMF, shows the tradeoff under the assumption 
that a single ad valorem tax rate is applied to both sectors and there is no minimum wage.    13 
 
As the tax rate rises from zero at A to the prohibitive level at O, welfare monotonically 
declines, and revenue is shown to rise and then fall, although the function need not be 
single peaked.  
How will a minimum wage affect the tradeoff?  We know from (17) that holding the 
tax rate constant, if and only if a small minimum wage raises employment will it raise 
welfare as well.  That is also the condition for output and revenue to rise.  Thus, holding 
the tax rate constant, a small minimum wage shifts each point on the frontier to the 
northeast or southwest, depending on whether it causes employment to rise or fall.    
Assume, holding the tax rate constant, a small minimum wage raises employment. 
For each minimum wage (including the nonbinding one) we create a curve which trades 
off welfare and revenue, a Minimum Wage Frontier, MWF. The easterly-most envelope 
of these frontiers, we label the Minimum Wage Envelope, MWE. MWE lies on or east of 
FMF in the range where FMF is upward sloping and lies east of it in the range where 
FMF slopes downward.  Consequently, the policy maker uses a minimum wage to 
acquire a better tradeoff between revenue and welfare than FMF offers, moving from her 
utility level of U
F to U
M
, where the superscript indicates the curve to which the 
indifference curve is tangent.  Holding the tax rate constant a large or small minimum 
wage must raise employment for it to increase either efficiency or revenue.  In the 
illustration, the minimum wage appealingly raises all three deserata. This leads us to:  
Proposition 5: Suppose a policy maker is free to choose a minimum wage and a common 
ad valorem tax on all wages. And suppose she seeks three objectives:  employment, 
efficiency and tax revenue.  Then her optimum equilibrium may be supported by a   14 
 
positive minimum wage in one sector, and it may be characterized by higher levels of 
employment, efficiency and revenue than in the optimum without a minimum wage. 
 
8. THE WELFARE-REVENUE TRADEOFF WHEN LABOR IS 
DIFFERENTIALLY TAXED 
Now suppose that it is possible to impose differential ad valorem taxes on wages in the 
two sectors.  Can a minimum wage improve the tradeoff?  Let’s construct an example in 
which this is the case.  
We have attached numbers to the coordinates in Figures 2, 3 and 4 to provide 
numerical examples.  Figure 2 presents a simple special case of the labor market we have 
been considering.  The two sectors have identical labor demands: abzD, so aggregate 
labor demand is acmD, where ac is twice ab.  Labor supply is the step function 0rjS, 
where S lies far to the right of j, meaning there is a very large supply of labor with a 
reservation wage of 0.6 pesos/day. With no tax or minimum wage, the wage is 0.5 
pesos/day, employment is 1.9 thousand workers, and output is valued at the area, 0acmnr 
= 1.45 thousand pesos/day.  This also measures welfare, since the labor hired has a 
reservation wage of zero.   
Figures 2 and 3 go about here. 
We can impose a specific tax of close to 0.5 pesos/worker-day without efficiency 
suffering. This is equivalent to an ad valorem tax of almost 100%.  That brings in almost 
0.95 thousand pesos/day of tax revenue.  RH is a rectangular hyperbola, which intersects 
the demand function to the right of n.  This means that revenue at c exceeds revenue at n. 
Consequently, when the tax rate rises almost to 1 peso/worker-day, equilibrium jumps   15 
 
almost to c, with revenue jumping to almost the striped area, R, 1 thousand pesos/day, 
and efficiency dropping by the shaded area, E, to 1 thousand pesos/day.  This is 
illustrated by the Free Market Frontier in Figure 3.  Note, in this example there is no 
payoff from imposing different tax rates in different sectors.  
Figure 4 illustrates what happens when we impose a minimum wage in manufacturing 
that lies above S and is given by eM = 0.7 pesos/day.  Manufacturing employment and 
wage is given by f, with manufacturing output given by area Oabp.  Almost all workers in 
manufacturing are drawn from the enormous labor pool of workers with a reservation 
wage of 0.6.  Consequently, the supply of labor to agriculture is OrjS, and agricultural 
equilibrium is at n, with agricultural output valued at Oabznr.  In the process, the value of 
aggregate output has expanded by pzmq, which is identical to Okzp.  But this process 
causes high-reservation wage labor to be absorbed into manufacturing.  This labor has 
sacrificed leisure it values at Oghp in order to work in minimum-wage manufacturing.  
Consequently, the minimum wage has caused an efficiency loss of the shaded area, kghz, 
denoted by E and valued at 0.05 thousand pesos/day, reducing efficiency to 1.4 thousand 
pesos/day as indicated by the top of the curve labeled High Minimum Wage Frontier in 
Figure 3. 
Figure 4 goes about here. 
Once the minimum wage is established, a tax per worker-day can be imposed in 
manufacturing of up to ga (with workers paying no more per worker-day than ge and 
employers paying no more than ea) and in agriculture of up to Ok, without changing 
employments or outputs or causing efficiency to shrink further.  This raises revenue up to 
the limit indicated in Figure 4 as the sum of the two striped areas, Rm and Ra, gabh +   16 
 
Oknr, 0.4*0.5 + 0.5*1.9 = 1.15 thousand pesos/day.  All this is indicated by Figure 4’s 
High Minimum Wage Frontier.
 5 
Assuming the policy maker’s indifference curves for welfare and revenue are given 
by the U’s in Figure 3, we see that utility rises from U
F, which grazes FMF at f, to U
M, 
which grazes HMWF at m.  As Figure 3 indicates both revenue and welfare rise.  
Employment rises as well. This leads us to 
Proposition 6: Suppose a policy maker is free to choose a minimum wage and different 
ad valorem tax rates on labor in the two sectors. And suppose she seeks three objectives:  
employment, efficiency and tax revenue. Then her optimum equilibrium may be supported 
by a positive minimum wage in one sector, and it may be characterized by higher levels 
of employment, efficiency and revenue than in the optimum without a minimum wage.  
 
9. INTUITIVE SUMMARY 
 
We have considered an economy (e.g., Chile 1973-83 or modern Turkey) with a 
minimum wage sector, a free sector and a tax on all labor earnings. We asked “Can a 
slightly binding minimum wage simultaneously raise tax revenue, employment, and 
economic efficiency? We discover this happens if and only if the elasticity of demand in 
the free sector exceeds the elasticity of demand in the minimum-wage sector.  
Here is the key to the paradox.  The minimum wage attracts high-reservation wage 
workers into the minimum-wage sector. If the labor demand curve in the free sector is 
quite flat, the vast majority of workers displaced by the minimum wage find employment 
in the free sector, raising aggregate employment. The displacement of workers by the 
only slightly-binding minimum wage has negligible effects on the utility of the labor 
                                                 
5 We label this the High Minimum Wage Frontier be cause the Minimum Wage Envelope is the envelope of   17 
 
which comes to be employed or is displaced by the minimum wage, because the new 
minimum wage is close to both the wage in the free sector and the reservation price that 
these workers put on leisure. But work is taxed and leisure is not, so the value of the 
marginal product of the new workers exceeds the value to them of leisure lost by the size 
of the tax. Consequently, the value of the basket of goods and leisure produced in the 
economy rises by the amount of the tax times the net new employment as the minimum 
wage pulls labor out of untaxed leisure, where too much of the labor force is lurking, into 
taxed work. This means that employment rises, efficiency rises as well, and since labor is 
taxed uniformly in both sectors, tax revenue rises as well.  
  We find that a policy maker who values employment, efficiency and tax revenue 
may be able to achieve more utility with a combination of taxes on employment and a 
minimum wage in one sector than can be achieved with taxes on employment alone.  
Moreover, the minimum-wage equilibrium may be characterized by higher levels of all 
three objectives than the no-minimum wage equilibrium.  These conclusions hold 
broadly. Specifically, they hold when the ad valorem wage  tax  
(a) is predetermined and the same in both sectors,  
(b) may be optimized but is constrained to be the same in both sectors, or 
(c)  may be optimized indendently in each sector. 
The general theory of the second best tells us that introducing a distortion into an 
already distorted economy may raise economic efficiency.  This paper presents yet 
another application of that proposition. 
 
10. PERSPECTIVE 
                                                                                                                                                 
the Free Market Frontier and the High Minimum Wage Frontier.   18 
 
Gottfried Haberler in Sweeney, Tower and Willett (1997, p.187) writes, “I believe in 
what some development economists call ‘monoeconomics,’ that is to say, the same 
economic principles apply to developing and developed countries alike.”  The analysis 
here also applies to more developed economies.  The idea that a hike in the minimum 
wage may raise employment has recently been emphasized by Ahn and Arcidiacono 
(2004), and Card and Krueger (1994 and 1995, p.38), although refuted empirically by 
Neumark and Wascher (2000).  The issue remains controversial.  For example:  
James Buchanan, the 1986 laureate for his work on public choice, said it best: “The inverse 
relationship between quantity demanded and price is the core proposition in economic science.”   
To assert that raising the minimum wage would actually increase employment, he continued, 
“becomes equivalent to a denial that there is even minimal scientific content in economics.”  
Merton Miller, a 1990 laureate for work on capital markets asks of the notion that a minimum 
wage boost is costless, “Is all this too good to be true?  Damn right.  But it sure plays well in the 
opinion polls.  I tremble for my profession.” 
Review and Outlook,” Wall Street Journal, April 29, 1996, p. A22). 
 
Are the results of this paper too good to be true?  A colleague thought so,  telling us  
“The results are so crazy that the mathematics must be wrong.” 
We have no reason to believe that the elasticity of demand for labor in the free sector 
is likely to be greater than the demand elasticity in the covered sector.  Consequently, we 
are skeptical that this mechanism is important in practice.
6  Minimum wages are likely to 
be promoted by populist politicians, who goose them up beyond efficiency maximizing 
levels.  They discriminate against the unskilled.  They introduce inflexibility into 
economies faced with adverse monetary and real shocks. They may be set with an eye to 
                                                 
6  Grimes and Tower (1998) built a computable general equilibrium model to explore 
whether the potential gains from exploiting the logic of this model were substantial.  
They find that the efficiency maximizing minimum wage is modest, and the efficiency 
and employment gains are also small when the labor supply elasticity is constant.  
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the short run when labor demand elasticities and the distorting effects of minimum wages 
are smaller than in the long run. Consequently, we do not advocate minimum wages.  
Still, we think that the mechanisms we have explored are important, and believe that it is 
worthwhile to explore the realms of possibilities that the standard tools of economics 
yield up.  Perhaps, the reader should think of our results as akin to the Giffen or Metzler 
paradoxes. 
There is another implication of our analysis that merits discussion. In our model with 
no taxes, the marginal welfare cost of a hike in the minimum wage is positive only when 
the initial minimum wage is binding and already distorting the labor market, just as is the 
case for a tariff imposed by a small country.  The introduction of a wage tax means that 
the marginal welfare cost of a hike in an initially binding minimum wage may be either 
positive or negative.  Thus, introduction of the tax expands the power of a minimum 
wage for good or evil. If the policy maker imposes the minimum wage on the sector with 
the higher labor demand elasticity, labor taxes make the cost greater than we would have 
otherwise calculated.   
Moreover, there is a presumption that minimum wages will shrink employment, and 
this will be costlier when taxes mean that labor is already being squeezed out of taxed 
employment into untaxed leisure. Thus, one of the morals of the paper is that future 
researchers who perform cost-benefit analysis of minimum wages could reckon with how 
they interact with tax distortions, both those that explicitly tax employment, and those 
that implicitly do so, like sales taxes and value-added taxes. 
Edgeworth (1908) in reviewing Bickerdike’s analysis of the optimum tariff, 
expressed the fear that it would provide fodder for unscrupulous protectionists, and   20 
 
admonished “Let us admire the skill of the analyst, but label the product of his analysis 
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FIGURE 1 Revenue versus welfare with uniform ad valorem taxes on wages.
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FIGURE 2 Revenue and efficiency with differential taxes permitted and no minimum wage.  25 
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FIGURE 4 Revenue and efficiency with differential taxes and a minimum wage. 